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Abstract
We present a Bayesian analysis of the epistemology of analogue experiments
with particular reference to Hawking radiation. First, we prove that such experi-
ments can be confirmatory in Bayesian terms based upon appeal to ‘universality
arguments’. Second, we provide a formal model for the scaling behaviour of the
confirmation measure for multiple distinct realisations of the analogue system
and isolate a generic saturation feature. Finally, we demonstrate that different po-
tential analogue realisations could provide different levels of confirmation. Our
results provide a basis both to formalise the epistemic value of analogue exper-
iments that have been conducted and to advise scientists as to the respective
epistemic value of future analogue experiments.
∗email: Dardashti@uni-wuppertal.de
†email: S.Hartmann@lmu.de
‡email: karim.thebault@bristol.ac.uk
§email: winsberg@usf.edu
1
Contents
1 Introduction 2
2 Confirmation, Analogy and Experiment 4
3 Hawking Radiation and Universality 6
4 Bayesian Analysis 9
4.1 Single Source Confirmation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2 Multiple Source Confirmation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.3 Confirmation Dependence on Source System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5 Conclusion and Prospectus 17
A Proofs 18
A.1 Theorem 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
A.2 Theorem 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
A.3 Theorem 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a proliferation of experiments designed to probe the phe-
nomenon of Hawking radiation via analogue black hole systems. Reports on these
experiments include claims of observation of classical, thermal aspects of Hawking
radiation in an analogue white hole created using surface water waves (Weinfurtner
et al. 2011; Weinfurtner et al. 2013) and observation of quantum entanglement across
an analogue horizon, as is expected from Hawking radiation, using a Bose-Einstein
Condensate (BEC) (Steinhauer 2016a). Despite these successes, an uncontested and
repeated experimental demonstration of the full analogue Hawking phenomenon is
still to be provided.1 The not fully settled experimental status of analogue Hawk-
ing radiation not withstanding, there is a clear need for methodological appraisal
of what, in principle, can be established about black hole Hawking radiation based
upon analogue experiments. The most pressing questions is whether or not there are
circumstances in which analogue experiments can be taken to provide inductive sup-
port for conclusions about astrophysical black holes. Can analogue experiments pro-
vide ‘experimental confirmation of Hawking’s prediction’ (Jeff Steinhauer quoted in
Haaterz (Efrati 2016)), or are they simply ‘amusing feat[s] of engineering’ that ‘won’t
teach us anything about black holes’ (Daniel Harlow quoted in Quanta (Shmahalo
2016) ).
In this paper we will substantially extend previous philosophical work charac-
terising analogue black hole experiments as a form of ‘analogue simulation’ (Dard-
ashti et al. 2017; The´bault 2019) via application of Bayesian confirmation theory. In
that previous analysis, emphasis was placed upon the qualitative claim that certain
1For more on surface water wave experiments see (Rousseaux et al. 2008; Rousseaux et al. 2010;
Michel and Parentani 2014; Unruh 2014; Euve´ et al. 2016; Torres et al. 2017; Euve´ et al. 2018). For
further results and discussion of the Steinhauer’s BEC experiments see (Steinhauer 2014; Steinhauer
2015; Finke et al. 2016; Steinhauer 2016b; de Nova et al. 2018; Leonhardt 2018).
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‘universality arguments’ can be used to link evidence about the ‘source’ dumb hole
system to the ‘target’ black hole system. The results of this paper are quantitive in
nature and licence normatively valuable conclusions regarding the structure of such
inferences.
We first present a theorem that demonstrates how the confirmation claim can be
qualitatively characterised in Bayesian terms. The role of the universality arguments
is understood in terms of support for a background assumption that is common
between the source and target models. This means that there is a binary variable
that can be assumed to be positively correlated with the empirical adequacy of both
the source and target models. Evidence in favour of the model of the source system
can thus be used to make inferences about the target system. Although not in-and-
of-itself a validation of the argument for confirmation via analogue simulation, the
Bayesian analysis demonstrates the internal consistency of the informal arguments
given in (Dardashti et al. 2017). Furthermore, the formal model provides a powerful
evaluative and heuristic tool for the further analysis of the structure of the inferences
involved in cases of analogue simulation. In particular, in the remains of the paper,
we present two further results that we expect will be of interest to contemporary
analogue black hole experimentalists.
Our second principal result relates to the behaviour of the confirmation measure
in the context of experimental realisations of the analogue system in different types of
media. This is of particular relevance to contemporary analogue black hole research
where a diverse range of analogue realisations of Hawking radiation are being pur-
sued: e.g., surface waterwaves, BECs, superfluid helium-3, moving optical media. The
immediate question in this context is how the number of distinct types of analogue
system one constructs relates to the confidence one should have in the astrophysical
effect. The second key result of this paper is a formal model for ‘multiple source’ ana-
logue simulation displaying the generic feature of ‘saturation’ in confirmatory power
with an increase in the number of sources. Significantly, the saturation in confirma-
tion indicates that, under plausible assignments of priors, even an extraordinarily
large range of diverse analogue experiments will not lead to conclusive confirmation
of astrophysical Hawking radiation. This is in tune with the scientific intuition that
there is a limit to what can be learned about astrophysical Hawking radiation via
analogue experiments.
Finally, and perhaps most intriguingly, there is the question of whether different
potential analogue realisations could provide different levels of confirmation. Would
we learn more about astrophysical black holes from an analogue experiment based
upon liquid helium or BECs? The third key result of the paper is a theorem proving
that analogue experiments in which we are more confident about the fundamental
physics (e.g. BECs) teach us less about the target system than those about which we
are less confident (e.g. superfluid helium-3). Our results thus provide a basis to both
formalise the epistemic value of analogue experiments that have been conducted and
to advise scientists as to the respective epistemic value of future analogue experi-
ments. As such, our work demonstrates the enduring value of the Bayesian frame-
work as a tool for analysing the protean forms of scientific inference.
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2 Confirmation, Analogy and Experiment
The literature on analogical reasoning in science is fairly extensive, with particularly
noteworthy contributions by Keynes (1921), Hesse (1963, 1964, 1974), Bailer-Jones
(2009) and Bartha (2010, 2013).2 Typically analogical arguments have the form of
abstract speculative inferences regarding possible features of one system (‘the target’)
based on known features of another system (‘the source’). Classic examples are Reid’s
argument for the existence of life on other planets based upon life on earth (Reid and
Hamilton 1850) or Hume’s argument for animal consciousness based upon human
consciousness (Hume 1978).
Analogical arguments evidently play an important heuristic role in scientific prac-
tice in that they provide ‘cognitive strategies for creative discovery’ (Bailer-Jones 2009,
p. 56). The epistemic role of analogical arguments in science is, however, more contro-
versial. In particular, the literature contains diverging answers regarding whether
analogical arguments can provide Bayesian confirmation of a hypothesis regarding
the target system. From a Bayesian perspective on confirmation, evidence for a hy-
pothesis can count as confirmatory only if the probability of the hypothesis given the
evidence together with certain background assumptions is larger than the probability
of the hypothesis given only the background assumptions. In a detailed and nuanced
treatment of the issue, Hesse (1974, pp. 208-19) suggests that analogical arguments
can in some cases be confirmatory in a Bayesian sense, so long as the analogical rela-
tionship that holds is in terms of what she calls a ‘material analogy’. That is, where
there is a similarity relation of sharing at least one predicate between the target and
source systems.3
Contrastingly, Bartha (2010, 2013) offers arguments that analogical arguments can-
not in principle be confirmatory in a Bayesian sense. In particular, he suggest that be-
cause the information encapsulated in an analogical argument is taken to already be
part of the ‘background knowledge’, the probability of a hypothesis regarding the
target system must be identical before and after including the analogical argument.
Bartha takes this instance of the familiar problem of old evidence (Glymour 1980)
to be significant enough to bar analogical arguments from being confirmatory in
Bayesian terms. Rather, following Salmon (1967, 1990), Bartha argues that arguments
by analogy can establish only the plausibility of a conclusion in the technical sense
of justifying the assignment of a non-negligible prior probability assignment (Bartha
2010, §8.5). On this analysis, it is not in principle possible for analogical arguments
to confer inductive support for a hypothesis. That is, although analogical arguments
can certainly be stronger or weaker, even the strongest possible analogical argument
cannot confer confirmation in a Bayesian sense: they are abstract inferences that can
only ever support plausibility claims rather than providing inductive evidence.
Although worthy and insightful, the treatments of Hesse (1974) and Bartha (2010)
do not extend to the analysis of analogue experiments. This is because analogue
experiments are unlike arguments by analogy in exactly the respects that are crucial
2See also Norton (2011) for an importantly different take on analogical arguments. Norton’s analysis
focuses on analogical arguments that proceed via subsumption of the target system into a larger
class of entities, including the source system. There are broad parallels between the structure of such
inferences and our analysis.
3Hesse (1974, p. 216) explicitly rules out the possibility of confirmation obtaining in cases where
there is purely a ‘formal analogy’. That is, where target and source are both interpretations of the same
formal calculus but do not share material similarities.
4
for either the Hesse or the Bartha analysis to go through. The question of whether
one agrees with Hesse or Bartha about the confirmatory power of arguments by
analogy is simply tangential to the analysis of the confirmatory power of analogue
experiments. In the case of Hesse, this is indicated by the fact that her notion of
material analogy is too strict to accommodate the subtle relation that the model of the
target has to the model of the source in the case of analogue black hole experiments.
We are dealing with an analogue simulation that does not involve a material analogy in
the sense of Hesse since there is not a physical property common between the target and
source systems. Rather than a material relation between systems, we have a syntactic
isomorphism between models.4,5
Bartha’s negative analysis of the prospect for confirmation via analogical argu-
ment is similarly inapplicable to analogue experiments. This is because analogue
experiments, unlike analogical arguments, are essentially empirical activities: they
involve learning about the world by manipulating it. In analogue black hole exper-
iments we manipulate the source such that certain explicit modelling assumptions
matching those for the target obtain. Analogue simulation thus resembles a form of
experimentation, involving the ‘programming’ of a physical system such that it can
be used to ‘simulate’ another physical system. Thus, we see that conclusions from
the philosophical analysis of analogical argument should not be taken to be readily
extendible to cases of analogue simulation in contemporary science. In particular, it
is self-evidently the case that the old evidence problem for the Bayesian analysis of
traditional arguments by analogy a` la Hesse, is not longer relevant for analogue ex-
periments. Analogue experiments unlike analogical reasoning explicitly involve the
collection of new evidence and there are not good grounds for relegating their signif-
icance to mere plausibility.
This collection of new evidence motivates us to consider the ‘epistemology of
analogue experimentation’ in parallel with the epistemology of conventional experi-
ments. As has been noted by various authors (Franklin 1989; Winsberg 2010; Franklin
and Perovic 2016)) conventional experiments are generally only of epistemologi-
cal significance when supplemented by arguments that imply that the information
learned about the system being manipulated (‘the source’) is relevantly probative
about the class of systems that are of interest to the experimenters (‘the target’). A
nice illustration of this point is provided by experiments designed to learn about
the thermal conductivity of the iron in Earth’s core (Konoˆpkova´ et al. 2016; Dob-
son 2016). The experiments were carried out in the lab using samples of iron that
are placed in a laser-heated diamond-anvil cell. The pressure and temperature that
the iron samples were subjected to were specifically matched to those relevant to the
cores of Mercury-sized to Earth-sized planets. For the experiments to achieve their
epistemic purpose, they must be supplemented with arguments that the measure-
ments are be ‘relevantly probative’ of the thermal conductivity of iron in the core’s
of Mercury-sized to Earth-sized planets. That is, there must be a basis to generalise
from the observations regarding the lab based system (the ‘source’), to relevant sys-
4Here ‘syntactic isomorphism’ is a natural generalisation of Hempel’s (1965) notion of nomic iso-
morphism to the case of a relation between models rather than laws.
5Hesse (1963), does in fact, rather presciently, consider the relevance of simulators in her account
of models and analogies in science. Tantalisingly, she says that analogue machines (i.e. simulators):
‘are useful and necessary as predictive models precisely in those cases where the material substance
of parts of the analogue is not essential to the model, but where the mutual relations of the parts are
essential’ (p. 102) This connection is unfortunately not taken up in the 1974 Bayesian analysis.
5
tems outside the lab (the ‘target’). In parallel, what we take to be the key question in
the epistemology of analogue experimentation is whether we can provide arguments
that the relevant source systems ‘stand-in’ for the target systems to which the analog-
ical relationship refers. Can we find arguments that analogue black hole experiments
are relevantly probative of the thermal properties of astrophysical black holes?6
3 Hawking Radiation and Universality
Hawking radiation (Hawking 1975) is a thermal phenomena that is predicted to be
generically associated with black holes. Despite the absence of either a clear causal
process behind the radiation or experimental evidence, it is widely believed in by
theoretical physicists. In fact, the ability to recover Hawking radiation could even be
taken as a theoretical test of prospective theories of quantum gravity, much like the
recovery of the Bekenstein-Hawking formula for black hole entropy (Wu¨thrich 2019).
There are two connected reasons why physicists are so confident in the prediction
of Hawking radiation. First, given the Unruh effect (Unruh 1976), which associates
a temperature with acceleration, Hawking radiation seems to be directly implied by
the equivalence principle.7 Second, starting from Hawking’s original calculation a
remarkable number of different derivations of the effect have been given.8 The con-
sensus is that the effect is ‘remarkably robust’ to the addition of complicating factors
to the original derivation. The overall implication is that very general theoretical con-
straints coming from quantum field theory and general relativity (two well tested
theories) necessitate that something like Hawking radiation must exist. The purpose
of this paper is not to address the evidential import of such theoretical considera-
tions. Rather, our focus is on the potential for analogue experiments to provide con-
firmatory evidence of a form akin to conventional experiments. This notwithstanding,
questions of robustness will return to the fore in the context of a particular form of
universality argument that will be found to be central for questions of confirmation.
Before then, it will be instructive to consider the basic elements of the original Hawk-
ing derivation of a radiative flux for astrophysical black holes in comparison with
their sonic analogues.
Hawking’s analysis is performed in the context of a semi-classical approach to
gravity. That is, we consider matter as described by quantum field theory and space-
time as described by a continuous classical geometry. Crucially, although the space-
time in question can have non-trivial curvature, it is not coupled to the quantum
field. That is, there can be no ‘back-reaction’ between the quantum matter and clas-
sical geometry. For this modelling framework to be valid it is assumed that we are
considering quanta of wavelengths much larger than the Planck length. Quanta of
the order of the Planck length could be expected to ‘see’ the (presumed) non-classical
and non-continuous structure of spacetime and would necessitate a quantum theory
of gravity in their description. Quite general formal considerations can be used to
show that in the semi-classical framework the vacuum state of a quantum scalar field
6See (The´bault 2019) for an analysis of the connection between the epistemology of analogue ex-
periments and the notions of internal’ and external validation as discussed in the philosophy of ex-
perimentation.
7Such a conclusion is, in fact, a little too quick since the equivalence principle holds only locally
and Hawking radiation is a global effect. See (Helfer 2010).
8 See (Leonhardt and Philbin 2008; Thompson and Ford 2008; Wallace 2018).
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defined at past null infinity need not appear as a vacuum state to observers at posi-
tive null infinity. In particular, it may contain a ‘particle flux’. What Hawking shows
in his original paper is that for spacetime in which an astrophysical black hole forms
there will be a particle flux which observers at positive null infinity will associate
with the black hole horizon. The asymptotic form of the expression for the particles
flux is shown to depend only upon the surface gravity of the black hole denoted by
κG. Surface gravity is essentially the force per unit mass that must be applied at in-
finity in order to hold a stationary zero angular momentum particle just outside the
horizon (Jacobson 1996). Hawking’s calculation implies that a black hole has intrinsic
properties that are connected to a non-zero thermal particle flux at late times. The
precise relation takes the form:
〈Nˆω〉 = 1
e
2pi ω
h¯ κG − 1
with TBH := h¯ κG/2pi, (1)
where Nˆω is the number operator for modes detected at late times with frequency ω
and h¯ is Planck’s constant divided by 2pi.
One key feature of the derivation of the temperature is worth noting here since
it will be very important in what follows. In the derivation of Hawking radiation
an exponential gravitational red-shift means that the black hole radiation detected
at late times must be taken to correspond to extremely high frequency radiation at
the horizon. These ‘trans-Planckian’ modes are of wavelengths that are of precisely
the kind that we presumed to exclude in using the semi-classical framework. There
is thus a tension between the initial modelling assumptions and the details of the
calculation. We will return to this issue shortly.
Not long after the derivation of Hawking’s radiation, it was proposed by Unruh
that a similar thermal effect might exist in the context of sound in fluid systems
(Unruh 1981). In particular, Unruh showed that the key elements of Hawking’s calcu-
lation could be re-applied in the context of a semi-classical model of sound in fluids.
The role of the spacetime geometry is now played by a ‘bulk’ fluid flow as described
by continuum hydrodynamics. The role of the quantum field is then played by a
quantized linear fluctuation within the fluid, a phonon. The modelling framework
of continuum hydrodynamics is only valid provided fluid density fluctuations of the
order of molecular lengths can be ignored. So for this semi-classical description to
be adequate the wavelengths of the phonons must be much larger than the inter-
molecular distances. Unruh’s brilliant insight was to recognise that there is a special
class of analogue fluid systems for which the equations of semi-classical continuum
hydrodynamics take a form isomorphic to those of semi-classical gravity. The role of
the black hole event horizon is now played by an effective acoustic horizon where
the inward flowing magnitude of the radial velocity of the fluid exceeds the speed of
sound. The black hole is replaced by a dumb hole. Just as in the gravitational Hawking
effect a black hole event horizon is associated with a late time thermal photonic flux,
in the hydrodynamic Hawking effect Unruh showed that a dumb hole sonic horizon
can be associated with a late time thermal phononic flux.
An alternative medium for constructing acoustic black holes, that behaves exactly
like a fluid in an appropriate limit, is give by a Bose-Einstein condensate (Garay et al.
2000). This is an exotic form of matter predicted in the 1920s (Bose 1924; Einstein 1924)
but not created experimentally until 1995 (Anderson et al. 1995). Crucially, in the limit
of weak coupling and no backreaction density fluctuations in a BEC are described by the
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Gross-Pitaevskii equation. When variations in the density of the BEC occur on length
scales much greater than the healing length, the Gross-Pitaevskii equation can be used
to derive an equation of the same form as that of an irrotational fluid derived by
continuum hydrodynamics. Following the same line of reasoning as Unruh’s original
ideal fluid argument, (Garay et al. 2000) derived a BEC Hawking Effect using appeal
to this hydrodynamic approximation to a BEC.
There are now a huge number of potential analogue realisations of the Hawk-
ing effect: phonons in superfluid helium-3, ‘slow light’ in moving media, traveling
refractive index interfaces in nonlinear optical media, laser pulses in nonlinear di-
electric medium.9 To realize the Hawking effect it seems it is sufficient to have: i) a
classical (effective) background with quantum fields living on it; and ii) an (effective)
geometry with an (effective) causal horizon.
A crucial feature in the derivation of all these effects is the integration over ex-
tremely high energy ‘trans-Planckian’ modes. As noted above, in the black hole case
these modes get included in the calculation due to an exponential redshift between
the horizon (where they originate) and the late time, far distance limit (where they
are detected). Such a feature is generic to all models of Hawking radiation in which
the modes originate near the horizon.10 Since the ‘trans-Planckian’ regime beyond the
domain of applicability of the semi-classical modelling framework we are using, this
problem of exponential redshift seems rather worrying. In fact, according to some, the
trans-Planckian problem is so serious as to cast doubt upon the Hawking calculation
entirely. Unruh, for instance, even asks that ‘if the derivation relies on such absurd
physical assumptions, can the result be trusted?’ (Unruh 2014, p. 534). The problem
with ‘trans-Planckian’ modes has a direct analogue in both the continuum hydrody-
namic and BEC derivations. In particular, the acoustic analogue of the gravitational
redshift, means that in both cases we are including in our calculation phonons of
wavelengths small enough to probe the regimes very far beyond the inter-molecular
length and healing length respectively.
Fortunately, there are good reasons to expect that the Hawking effect in both
gravitational and analogue cases will be robust to disturbance from trans-Planckian
modes. In particular, Unruh and Schu¨tzhold (2005) have provided strong theoretical
reasons to expect that, under certain conditions, any modifications to the Hawking
flux by trans-Planckian modes will be negligible.11 Unruh and Schu¨tzhold show that
a wide family of trans-Planckian effects can be factored into the calculation of Hawk-
ing radiation via a non-trivial dispersion relation. To lowest order and given certain
modelling assumptions, Hawking radiation, both astrophysical and acoustic, is inde-
pendent of the details of the underlying physics.
A significant distinction that can be made in this context is between robustness
and universality.12 Robustness is the insensitivity of a phenomenon under a token-
9See (Jacobson and Volovik 1998; Philbin et al. 2008; Belgiorno et al. 2010; Unruh and Schu¨tzhold
2012; Liberati et al. 2012; Nguyen et al. 2015; Jacquet 2018).
10It is worth noting here that whilst, the non-standard derivation of (Giddings 2016) does appear to
allow one to avoid this feature, that of (Polchinski 1995), prima facie, does not (Harlow 2016, pp. 37-8).
11For further work on these issues, using a range of different methodologies, see for example (Corley
1998; Himemoto and Tanaka 2000; Barcelo´, Garay, and Jannes 2009; Coutant, Parentani, and Finazzi
2012). For philosophical discussion see (Dardashti, The´bault, and Winsberg 2017) and (Gryb, Palacios,
and The´bault 2018).
12Here we are drawing upon the account of (Gryb et al. 2018) who in turn are largely following the
discussion of (Batterman 2000).
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level variation with respect to different possible micro-physics in a single type of
system. Universality is the insensitivity of a phenomenon under a type-level variation
between systems with fundamentally different material constitution (e.g. BECs and
a classical fluid). Given these definitions, we can plausibly take the work of Unruh
and Schu¨tzhold to be an argument for both the robustness and the universality of the
Hawking effect. We can also, on this basis, draw a suggestive parallel to the notion of
‘universality’ found in the context of condensed matter physics. That said, nothing in
our analysis will hang upon the particular characterisation of universality.13 Rather,
inferentially speaking, what is important is that the ‘universality argument’ in ques-
tion provides support for a background assumption, common between the different
models, that has moderate prior probability. The common background assumption
supported by the argument of Unruh and Schu¨tzhold is that in general ultra high
frequency physics does not significantly effect the Hawking spectrum. We take it that
the Unruh and Schu¨tzhold arguments imply that such a common background as-
sumption should not have a very low prior, and the trans-Planckian problem implies
that such a common background assumption should not have a very high prior. In
general terms, there are good reasons to expect that universality arguments will per-
form something like this function, but nothing in what follows will depend upon this
assumption.
4 Bayesian Analysis
4.1 Single Source Confirmation
The key claim that we wish to investigate is whether analogue ‘dumb hole’ experi-
ments can provide inductive support for hypotheses regarding black holes given we
believe the appropriate universality arguments. In what follows we give a Bayesian
network representation of the proposed inferential structure of analogue simulation
defended in (Dardashti et al. 2017) and show that the evidence in the source sys-
tem can provide confirmation of hypotheses regarding the target system in certain
circumstances.14
Let us start with the representation of the target system T . We denote by M a
propositional variable that takes the two values:
M: The modelling frameworkM provides an empirically adequate description of the
target system T within a certain domain of conditions DM.
¬M: The modelling framework M does not provide an empirically adequate de-
scription of the target system T within a certain domain of conditions DM.
The adequacy of the modelling framework M depends on whether the background
assumptions which justify the empirical adequacy of the modelling framework ob-
tain. We denote with XM the random variable with the values:
13(Gryb et al. 2018) investigates these parallels at length. Analogue experiments that might plausibly
be described using our formal framework based upon Wilsonian universality arguments are (Thouless
1989; Pru¨fer et al. 2018; Erne et al. 2018; Eigen et al. 2018).
14For models of confirmation in terms of the Bayesian framework see (Hartmann and Sprenger 2010;
Bovens and Hartmann 2003) or for the hypothetic-deductive framework see (Betz 2013). Throughout
this paper, we follow the convention that propositional variables are printed in italic script, and that
the instantiations of these variables are printed in roman script.
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XM: The background assumptions xM = {x1M, x2M, . . . , xnM} are satisfied for target
system T .
¬XM: The background assumptions xM = {x1M, x2M, . . . , xnM} are not satisfied for tar-
get system T ,
where the second statement should be read in terms of a negation of the disjuncts. The
role of the background assumptions is to define and justify the domain of conditions
for the model. These assumptions involve knowledge, both theoretical and empirical,
which goes beyond what is encoded within the model. Such knowledge need not
be in the form of a simple, unified framework. Rather the background knowledge
of the people who build and use models can contain an incompletely integrated
set of explicit and tacit ideas about when a particular modelling framework will be
adequate for a particular purpose and to a particular desired degree of accuracy.
With this in mind, we can introduce the random variables A and XA for the source
system S described by the modelling framework A. The variable A is a propositional
variable that takes the two values:
A: The modelling framework A provides an empirically adequate description of the
source system S within a certain domain of conditions DS .
¬A: The modelling framework A does not provide an empirically adequate descrip-
tion of the source system S within a certain domain of conditions DA.
and XA is the random variable with the values:
XA: The background assumptions xA = {x1A, x2A, . . . , xkA} are satisfied for source sys-
tem S .
¬XA: The background assumptions xA = {x1A, x2A, . . . , xkA} are not satisfied for source
system S .
The systems S and T are assumed to represent different types of systems and thus
have fundamentally different material constitutions. This means that the background
assumptions behind the models M and A can reasonably be assumed to be very
different. For example, compare the assumption of a curved but fixed spacetime for
a black hole with the assumption of a flat spacetime for an analogue black hole; or
compare the assumption of a continuous non-back-reacting spacetime for the black
hole with the assumption of a continuous non-back-reacting bulk fluid flow for the
analogue black hole. Given this, it is justified, prima facie, to assume that XM and
XA are probabilistically independent (we will discuss the status of this assumption
further shortly). Furthermore, we have assumed that the source system is empirically
accessible meaning we can gain empirical evidence regarding (at least) some of its
consequences. We can encode this by introducing a variable E corresponding to the
two values, E, the empirical evidence obtains, and ¬E, the empirical evidence does
not obtain.
We can represent all the variables introduced thus far as well as the probabilistic
dependencies using a Bayesian network (Bovens and Hartmann 2003). The random
variables are represented as ‘nodes’ in the network (i.e. circles) and the probabilistic
dependences as directed edges (i.e. arrows). We draw an arrow between two nodes
when the variable in the ‘parent node’ has a direct influence on the variable in the
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Figure 1: The one-source system without universality.
‘child node’. Unconditional probabilistic independence is represented implicitly by
the absence of an arrow between two nodes. The entire set up thus far is represented
by the Bayesian network in Figure 1.
Consider the case of an analogue black hole experiment, leading an agent to learn
E, in a context where the agent does not fully believe in any form of universality
argument. Clearly, due to the probabilistic independence of XM and XA and of M
and A, we expect the independence of M and E and thus have that P(M|E) = P(M).
We therefore do not have confirmation. This is despite the fact that the equations
of the source model are syntactically isomorphic to the equations that are supposed
to govern the behaviour of the target model. The isomorphism is somewhat sur-
prising, given that one arrives at the equations starting from very different areas of
physics (i.e. semi-classical gravity and semi-classical continuum hydrodynamics) and
by making different background assumptions. However, the agent has no reason to
believe that the isomorphism represents a deeper fact about nature: on its own, the
syntactic relation between the models gives us no reason to doubt the probabilistic
independence of XM and XA.
There will, of course, always be available some basis to connect certain of the
background assumptions. For instance, common features such as the dimensionality
of spacetime or the masslessness of relevant force carrying particles.15 Thus, strictly
speaking, background assumptions regarding different systems are never probabilis-
tically independent. The reason why it is safe to neglect such common background
assumptions for the purposes of confirmation is that they will generally be generic
statements about which we have high confidence. This means that they cannot lead
to any significant confirmation being transferred between E and M and can thus be
neglected (see (Howson and Urbach 2006, §4.c)).
Now, consider a context where the agent does believe in a universality argument
for Hawking radiation, such as that provided by Unruh and Schu¨tzhold. The uni-
versality arguments give a physical justification for interpreting the syntactic isomor-
phism as indicative of a deeper fact about nature. In particular, it implies that we
should assign a moderate prior to the common background assumption that ultra
high frequency physics does not significantly effect the Hawking spectrum. It is cru-
cial here that without the universality argument none of the type-specific forms of this
background assumption already have high priors. Consider a situation where with-
15See (Dardashti, The´bault, and Winsberg 2017, §3.2) for discussions of such common background
assumptions in the context of 1/r2 force laws.
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out the universality argument we already had strong independent grounds on which
to assign high probability to the background assumption that for a particular type
of analogue system the ultra high frequency physics does not significantly effect the
Hawking spectrum. This would mean that the relevant member of XA, correspond-
ing to the specific statement of independence from ultra high frequency physics for
that system, would have very high prior. In such a case, not much inductive support
would be added to the generic form of the statement by learning E. This would block
the transfer of confirmation from E to M. It is thus particularly significant that due to
the generic nature of the trans-Planckian problem, the member of XA corresponding
to the specific statement of independence from ultra high frequency physics will for
every type of system have a relatively low prior. There is thus a clear route for strong
inductive support to flow through the generic statement of independence from ultra
high frequency physics.
With these considerations in mind, let us then introduce a new binary variable X
that has the values:
X: Ultra high frequency physics does not significantly effect the Hawking spectrum.
¬X: Ultra high frequency physics does significantly effect the Hawking spectrum.
X expresses a rather general claim, which can plausibly be assumed to have neither
very high nor very low credence (if we were certain about X, the inference from A to
M would be blocked. We will say more about this later).
For the sake of simplicity, let us now subsume the background assumptions, that
are not addressed by X (or any other generic statement) under the relevant nodes.
That is, we will subsume background assumptions exclusively concerning the target
system T under M and background assumptions exclusively concerning the source
system S under A.
Under the conditions of our assumptions, the simplified Bayesian network given
in Figure 2 will then adequately model the chain of inferences involved in analogue
simulation supported by universality arguments. We would like to show that E con-
firms M within a Bayesian theory of confirmation. This requires that one proves that
P(M|E) > P(M). For this purpose we need to specify the prior probability of the
‘parent node’ in the Bayesian network, i.e.
P(X) =: x, (2)
and the conditional probabilities of all ‘child nodes’, given the values of their parents,
i.e.
P(M|X) =: mx , P(M|¬X) =: mx¯
P(A|X) =: ax , P(A|¬X) =: ax¯ (3)
P(E|A) =: ea , P(E|¬A) =: ea¯ .
The first central assumption is that the prior probability of X lies in the open
interval (0, 1). However, as we discussed in Sect. 3, we have theoretical arguments,
in particular the result by Unruh and Schu¨tzhold, in favour of X. So a rational agent
would assign
1/2 < x < 1. (4)
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Figure 2: The one-source system with universality.
The conditional probabilities are then constrained by the following conditions:
mx > mx¯ (5)
ax > ax¯ (6)
ea > ea¯ (7)
The conditions (4) to (6) encode probabilistically the relevant elements of the univer-
sality argument since they allow for the possibility of a background assumption that
supports both M and A. The statement (7) encodes probabilistically that the empirical
evidence actually plays the role of evidence in favour of the modelling framework A.
With this, the following theorem holds (the proof is in Appendix A.1):
Theorem 1 Consider the Bayesian network depicted in Figure 2 with the prior probability
distribution P defined in eqs. (2) and (3). Then P(M|E) > P(M), if conditions (4) to (7) are
satisfied.
Theorem 1 implies that E confirms M within a Bayesian analysis of confirmation.
Note that Theorem 1 also holds if condition (4) is replaced by the weaker condition
0 < x < 1. Hence, within the framework of analogue simulation, provided we have
universality arguments with prior probability that is neither unity or zero, confir-
mation of a hypothesis regarding the target system can obtain based upon evidence
relating to the source system.
It is important to note again that having independent grounds on which to support
one of the common background assumptions will ‘block’ the inductive support E can
give for M as that background assumption already has a large marginal probability.
This does not pose a problem for this account but offers a way to distinguish between
those circumstances in which the novel empirical evidence E can provide substantial
inductive support for M and those circumstances it cannot be used for that purpose.
An important implication of the Bayesian analysis relates to the role of the syn-
tactic isomorphism. The structure of the Bayesian network is such that the syntactic
isomorphism is not explicitly represented. Furthermore, based upon the network,
even if no syntactic isomorphism obtains between the modelling frameworksM and
A, one could sensibly talk about confirmation of M by E, provided there exists some
non-empty set of shared background assumptions. The key point is that in such cir-
cumstances although confirmation of M would indeed obtain, there would be no
‘analogue simulation’. As discussed above, the role of the isomorphism is to guaran-
tee that there will be a term within the modelling language ofM that is counterpart
to the term within A that refers to the empirical evidence specified in variable E.
13
Without such a term within M there would be no sense in which S is acting as
a simulator for the behaviour of T . Although the syntactic isomorphism is not ex-
plicitly represented in the network, it is implicitly stipulated within the universality
argument. Furthermore, as noted above, the universality argument is exactly the rea-
son we take the syntactic isomorphism to be indicative of a deeper fact about nature.
Although it cannot be used to establish confirmation, the syntactic isomorphism is a
crucial, if ultimately non-fundamental, heuristic for finding the universality argument
that can.
To recapitulate, in this section we have demonstrated that confirmation via ana-
logue simulation obtains within a Bayesian analysis provided there exists an infer-
ential connection between the conditions of applicability of the target and system
models. That is, if there exists a binary variable that is assumed to be positively
correlated with the empirical adequacy of both the source and target models, then
evidence in favour of the model of the source system can be used to make inferences
about the target system. This, in-and-of-itself, is not a particularly surprising result,
and certainly the demonstration of such in principle inferential relations is not a val-
idation of the framework for analogue simulation that is being proposed. Rather, we
take the results of this section to: i) demonstrate the internal consistency of the in-
formal arguments towards confirmation via analogue simulation given in (Dardashti
et al. 2017); and ii) provide a powerful evaluative and heuristic tool for the analysis of
analogue simulation as it exists within contemporary scientific practice. Two natural
directions of further development are: i) the identification and evaluation of potential
cases of confirmation via analogue simulation in other scientific examples; and ii) the
refinement of the Bayesian model to include cases within more than one analogue
system. The second of these will be pursued in the following section.
4.2 Multiple Source Confirmation
The systems S and T discussed in the previous section were assumed to be different
types of systems and thus have fundamentally different material constitution. In the
context of analogue experiments for Hawking radiation we could think of S as a BEC
analogue back hole and T as an astrophysical black hole. Of course, as already noted,
there are in fact a variety of further types of analogue black holes in addition to the
BEC. For example, rather than making use of the syntactic isomorphism between BEC
and gravitational models we might draw inferences based upon analogue black holes
constructed out of traveling refractive index interfaces in nonlinear optical media or
‘slow light’ in moving media (Carusotto et al. 2008).
With such examples in mind, we can extend the analysis of the previous section
to consider the case when we have multiple types of sources each providing indepen-
dent evidence for the target system modelling framework. The expectation would be
that adding more source systems should increase the degree of confirmation, but that
this increase will eventually reach some ‘saturation point’ when we cannot learn any
more about the target system by conducting additional analogue experiments.
Consider a Bayesian network for an n-source system (Figure 3). The question we
would like to answer is how does the confirmation measure change as one increases
the number of different analogue systems providing us with evidence. Following the
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Figure 3: The n-source system with universality.
same line of reasoning as the last section we assume:
a′x > a′¯x , e′a′ > e
′
a¯′
a′′x > a′′¯x , e′′a′′ > e
′′
a¯′′ (8)
...
a(n)x > a
(n)
x¯ , e
(n)
a(n)
> e(n)
a¯(n)
We can now calculate the corresponding difference measure of confirmation,
which is defined as
∆(n) := P(M|E, E′, . . . , E(n))− P(M). (9)
It satisfies the following theorem (the proof is in Appendix A.2):
Theorem 2 Consider the Bayesian Network depicted in Figure 3 with the prior probability
distribution P defined analogously to Theorem 1. Then ∆(n) > 0 is a strictly increasing
function of the number of source systems, if conditions (4), (5), and (8) are satisfied.
This theorem implies that as the number of different analogue systems providing ev-
idence increases so does the degree of confirmation.16 Again, this is not a particularly
surprising result. Given that confirmation via analogue simulation obtains for a single
source system, one would expect that adding in more and more (independent) source
systems would allow one to increase the degree of confirmation. The feature that is
most interesting is not the fact that ∆(n) is strictly increasing, but rather the func-
tional form of this increase. In particular, the natural intuition is that as the number
of source systems increases the increase in the degree of confirmation would eventu-
ally saturate. One of the chief virtues of the Bayesian model for analogue simulation
with multiple source systems is that it allows us to give an analytical expression for
such a saturation point.
First, let us consider how ∆(n) changes in the large n limit. A little analytical work
(again see Appendix A.2) allows us to show that17
lim
n→∞∆
(n) = x (mx −mx¯) =: ∆sat . (10)
This means that the maximum amount of confirmation one can obtain by adding in
more and more sources is bounded by some finite value, viz. ∆sat, determined by
16Note that also Theorem 2 holds if condition (4) is replaced by the weaker condition 0 < x < 1.
17Here (and below) we use the convenient notation x := 1− x.
15
Figure 4: The confirmation measure ∆(n) as a function of n for mx −mx¯ = 0.8 and
γn = 1.9n and three different priors of X.
the prior probabilities x, mx and mx¯. Beyond this point, there is vanishingly small
added value (in terms of confirmation) achieved by adding in more source systems.
Two features of ∆sat are worth remarking on. First, the higher the prior probability
of X the lower the saturation point will be. This makes sense because the more sure
we are of X to start with, the lower the limit on the extra information we can learn
from E, E′, . . . , E(n). Second, the higher the relative likelihood of M given X to M
given ¬X (i.e. mx − mx¯), the higher the saturation point. This makes sense because
the stronger the relationship between X and M the more we can potentially learn
from E, E′, . . . , E(n).
A further interesting feature that we can examine is the speed with which the
saturation point is approached. We can examine this ‘rate of saturation’ by plotting
∆(n) (as specified in eq. (22) in Appendix A.2) for a set of prior probabilities of X.
As can be seen from Figure 4, the higher the prior probability of X, the quicker the
saturation point is reached. Strikingly, for the values of the parameters considered,
we find that given a prior of greater than 0.5 for X, saturation can be reached after
only three or four successful analogue experiments.
This result is in tune with scientific intuitions regarding analogue simulation in the
context of universality arguments. Consider, in particular, the dumb hole Hawking
radiation case. Let us assume that an uncontested and repeated experiment demon-
strating BEC Hawking radiation has already been carried out. Given initial confidence
in the universality arguments, another different implementation of a source system
displaying the Hawking effect (say in nonlinear optics) would strongly increase the
belief in the astrophysical Hawking effect. However, once a few such examples were
constructed, one would quickly stop gaining new insight. Conversely, given initial
skepticism regarding the universality arguments, a second implementation of the
dumb hole source system would not radically increase the belief in the astrophys-
ical Hawking effect. Furthermore, in such circumstances it would only be after a
diverse and extensive range of implementations of source systems that one would
16
stop believing that new examples gave new information. Significantly, the saturation
in confirmation indicates that, under plausible assignments of priors, even an ex-
traordinarily large range of diverse analogue experiments will not lead to conclusive
confirmation of astrophysical Hawking radiation. This is in tune with the scientific
intuitions that there is a limit to what can be learned about astrophysical Hawking
radiation via analogue experiments.
4.3 Confirmation Dependence on Source System
Although most of the proposed analogue models of black hole Hawking radiation
have not been tested yet, there can be significant differences in our prior belief re-
garding the adequacy of these models. One reason for this is that the modelling may
rely on a strong theoretical basis in one system but a rather conjectural basis in the
other. For example, the fundamental physics of BECs is better understood, via the
Bogoliubov theory, than that of superfluid helium-3. Another reason is that one may
have good control of the experimental setup, such that one has more reason to rely
on the adequate realization of the various idealizing assumptions involved in the
derivation of the model.
Such differences imply that we may plausibly assign significantly different
marginal probabilities to the analogue models. In such circumstances, it is then in-
teresting to consider the degree to which variations in the marginal probabilities
one assigns to the adequacy of the analogue model may affect the confirmation be-
haviour of the analogue setup. The following theorem addresses this question for the
one-source model (see Appendix A.3 for details and the proof):
Theorem 3 Consider the Bayesian Network depicted in Figure 2 with the prior probability
distribution P defined in eqs. (2) and (3). Let ∆ := P(M|E)− P(M) and a := P(A). Then
d∆/da < 0, if conditions (4) to (7) hold.
This plausible result implies that an assignment of a higher probability to the ad-
equacy of the analogue model will have the effect of a decrease in the confirmation of
the adequacy of the target model by the observation of the analogue Hawking effect.
Or to put it differently: the more certain we are about the adequacy of the analogue
model that describes the source system we are experimenting on, the less effective
is the evidence obtained there in confirming the adequacy of the model of the target
system. Significantly, this result has direct implications for the respective epistemic
value of future analogue experiments. In particular, all else being equal, it implies
that scientists will learn more about the target system by conducting future analogue
experiments using media about which we are less certain regarding their fundamental
physics (i.e. marginal of A is lower), than those using media about which we are more
confident regarding their fundamental physics (i.e. marginal of A is higher).
5 Conclusion and Prospectus
History is replete with examples of ‘transformative’ technology having a profound
and lasting impact on the methodological foundations of science. Much recent lit-
erature in the philosophy of science has focused on the sense in which computer
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simulation should be taken to have had such an impact.18 Analogue simulation is a
new inferential tool found at the cutting edge of modern science that we see good
reasons to take as potentially transformative. Building upon the initial analysis of
(Dardashti et al. 2017), in this paper we have applied a Bayesian analysis to explicate
the structure of inferences that analogue simulation can and cannot allow us to make.
Our three principal results are: i) that ‘single source’ confirmation via analogue
simulation can obtain under certain conditions; ii) that ‘multiple source’ confirmation
via analogue simulation displays the generic feature of saturation in confirmatory
power; and iii) that analogue experiments in which we are more confident about the
fundamental physics provide less confirmation via analogue simulation than those
about which we are more confident. Our results provide a basis to both formalise
the epistemic value of analogue experiments that have been conducted and to advise
scientists as to the respective epistemic value of future analogue experiments.
A Proofs
A.1 Theorem 1
We have to show that
P(M|E) = P(M, E)
P(E)
> P(M). (11)
To do so, we consider the Bayesian network depicted in Figure 1 and follow the
general methodology described in (Bovens and Hartmann 2003, Sect. 3.5). First, we
calculate
P(M, E) = ∑
A,X
P(X, M, A, E)
= ∑
A,X
P(X) P(M|X) P(A|X) P(E|A)
= x mx (axea + a¯x ea¯) + xmx¯ (ax¯ ea + a¯x¯ ea¯)
= x mx α+ x mx¯ β, (12)
with
α := ax ea + a¯x ea¯ , β := ax¯ ea + a¯x¯ ea¯. (13)
Note that α = P(E|X) and β = P(E|¬X). Similarly we obtain
P(E) = ∑
A,M,X
P(X, M, A, E)
= x α+ x β (14)
and
P(M) = ∑
A,E,X
P(X, M, A, E)
= x mx + x mx¯. (15)
18See for example (Hartmann 1996; Humphreys 1995; Humphreys 2004; Parker 2009; Winsberg 1999;
Winsberg 2010).
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Figure 5: The 2-source system with universality.
Next, we define the difference measure ∆ := P(M|E) − P(M) and obtain after
some algebra:
∆ =
x mx α+ x mx¯ β− (x mx + x mx¯) (x α+ x β)
x α+ x β
=
x x
x α+ x β
· (mx −mx¯) (α− β) (16)
With
α− β = (ax − ax¯) (ea − ea¯) (17)
it follows that
∆ =
x x
x α+ x β
· (ax − ax¯) (ea − ea¯) (mx −mx¯). (18)
Hence, ∆ > 0, if conditions (4) to (7) are satisfied. This completes the proof of
Theorem 1.
A.2 Theorem 2
To see how Theorem 1 can be generalized to the n-source systems represented in
Figure 3 let us consider first the simplified 2-source system represented in Figure 5.
Here we need to show that P(M|E, E′) = P(M, E, E′)/P(E, E′) > P(M). To do so, we
first calculate
P(M, E, E′) = ∑
A,A′,X
P(X, M, A, E, A′, E′)
= ∑
A,A′,X
P(X) P(M|X) P(A|X) P(E|A) P(A′|X) P(E′|A′)
= x mx α α′ + x mx¯ β β′, (19)
where α′ and β′ are defined analogously to eqs. (13) with e and a replaced by e′ and
a′.
Similarly we obtain
P(E, E′) = ∑
A,A′,X
P(X) P(E|A) P(A|X) P(E′|A′) P(A′|X)
= x α α′ + x β β′. (20)
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Defining ∆(2) := P(M|E, E′)− P(M) it follows that
∆(2) =
x x
x α α′ + x β β′
· (mx −mx¯) (α α′ − β β′). (21)
Now it is easy to see that α α′ − β β′ > 0 iff (α/β) · (α′/β′) > 1. This holds if α > β
and α′ > β′. Both conditions hold because of assumptions (8). Hence, ∆(2) > 0, if
conditions (4), (5), and (8) are satisfied.
It is straightforward to generalise this calculation to the n-source system repre-
sented in Figure 3. We obtain
∆(n) =
x x (mx −mx¯)
(
∏nk=1 α
(k) −∏nk=1 β(k)
)
x∏nk=1 α(k) + x ∏
n
k=1 β
(k)
=
x x
xγn + x
· (mx −mx¯) · (γn − 1) , (22)
with the likelihood ratio γn := ∏nk=1 α
(k)/β(k). Note that α(k) > β(k) for all k implies
that γn > 1. Hence, as before, ∆(n) > 0, if conditions (4), (5), and (8) are satisfied.
Note that γn strictly monotonically increases with n. Furthermore,
∂∆(n)
∂γn
=
x x (mx −mx¯)
(x γn + x)
2 > 0, (23)
if conditions (4), (5), and (8) are satisfied. Hence, ∆(n) is a positive function of n. This
completes the proof of Theorem 2.
In closing this section, we investigate the limiting behaviour of ∆(n) as a function
of n. Setting κ := x x (mx −mx¯), we obtain
lim
n→∞∆
(n) = lim
x→∞ κ
γn − 1
x γn + x
= lim
x→∞ κ
1− 1/γn
x + x/γn
= κ/x
= x (mx −mx¯), (24)
where we have used the fact that limn→∞ γn = ∞.
A.3 Theorem 3
The proof follows from a straight-forward computation starting from eq. (18):
d∆
da
=
∂∆
∂ax
· dax
da
+
∂∆
∂ax¯
· dax¯
da
+
∂∆
∂x
· dx
da
=
1
x
· ∂∆
∂ax
+
1
x
· ∂∆
∂ax¯
+
1
(ax − ax¯) ·
∂∆
∂x
, (25)
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where we have used that a := x ax + x ax¯. Taking the respective partial derivatives
yields
∂∆
∂ax
=
k x x
(x α+ x β)2
·
(
x α+ x β− (ax − ax¯)(ea − ea¯) x
)
∂∆
∂ax¯
= − k x x
(x α+ x β)2
·
(
x α+ x β− (ax − ax¯)(ea − ea¯) x
)
∂∆
∂x
= − k (ax − ax¯)
(x α+ x β)2
·
(
x2 α− x2 β
)
.
Here we have used the shorthand k := (ea− ea¯) (mx−mx¯). Plugging these expressions
into eq. (25) one obtains after some algebra that
d∆
da
= − k
(x α+ x β)2
·
(
x (3 x− 1) α− x (3 x− 1) β
)
. (26)
Assumptions (5) and (7) imply that k > 0 and assumptions (4), (6) and (7) imply
that the large bracket is positive. (To see this, note that x (3 x− 1) > x (3 x− 1) for
1/2 < x < 1.) Hence, d∆/da < 0. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
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